Election Reform In Canada
Winnipeg, MB - April 7, 2001 - by: Cassandra Loiselle
preferences of citizens	An electoral system in the mechanisms by which the preferences of citizens are translated into seats in representative institutions(1). Some scholars have suggested that elections in a representative democracies should ideally accomplish four goals: first a parliament reflecting the main trends of opinion within the electorate, a government according to the wishes of the majority of the electorate, the election of representatives whose personal qualities best fit them for the function of government and lastly a strong and stable government(2). In Canada under the Single Member Plurality system these goals are not accomplished. The current electoral system should be modified to a mixed system of single member plurality and proportional representation.
most votes	The current system of single member plurality does not meet the first two goals as set out but it does fulfill the last of the two goals. Under single member plurality one representative is elected from each constituency. Each elector has one vote for his or her favorite candidate. The translation of votes into seats is based on winning the most votes, no necessarily the majority of votes. Single member plurality systems do not reflect the main trends of the opinion within the electorate. The government of a country should reflect the opinions of the voters expressed in the votes cast during an election. Single member plurality systems however:
exaggerate	Tend to exaggerate the parliamentary representation of the strongest party, to penalize the second party and to devastate third parties whose support is thinly spread across the breadth of the county(3)
wishes of the majority	This exaggeration can be seen in the results of the November 2000 Election. Take for example the Liberal Party and the Progressive Conservative Party. In the 2000 election the Liberal Party received 57.1% of the seats in the House of Commons, while receiving only 41.8% of the national popular vote(4) . The Progressive Conservative party received 12.1 percent of the popular vote but only four percent of the seats in the House of Commons. In the 2000 election it is notable that only 152 — or roughly 50.5% of the Members of Parliament were elected with over 50% of the popular vote in their riding. It is fair to say that in an election where a representative can receive only 31.1% of the popular vote yet is elected does not reflect the main trends within the electorate. The Government of Canada does not govern according to the wishes of the majority of the electorate, as the majority of the electorate does not elect it.
discouraging voters to vote	The Plurality system has many weaknesses, which prevents it from representing accurately the wishes of the majority. The first major weakness of the system is lower voter turn out. In the recent 2000 election voter turn out is estimated to be 61.2% of registered voters(5). "Most Canadians are not confident that they understand or can influence the political system, and many are skeptical about the possibility of producing any significant change through elections"(6) thus discouraging voters to vote. If voters are discouraged from electoral participation, "small groups holding extreme positions may be prompted to resort to other than democratic means to advance their cause."(7) It has been found that 42% of those surveyed found our present system where a party can win a majority of seats and form the government without winning a majority of votes acceptable.(8) As outlined above the plurality systems: "cannot be relied upon, either to give a parliament reflecting all the main trends of opinion, or to place in power a government backed by the majority of the electorate or even by the largest body of voters."(9) It is important to note that by exaggerating the strength of the government party, this system produces weak, ineffective opposition.(10) A country like Canada is extremely susceptible to the problems with national and regional support issues, for example the Canadian Alliance who mainly has regional support but formed the official opposition.
national and regional	In Canada the problem of weak and ineffective opposition is exaggerated by the distribution of support for the non-government parties. In large countries single member plurality systems have a tendency to discriminate against those parties whose support in spread across the country and favors parties with strong regional presence but little national support.(11) Take again the 2000 general election focusing this time on the New Democratic Party and the Canadian Alliance. The New Democratic Party has national support that is spread thinly across the country. In the 2000 election, of the six provinces where the New Democrats won seats, they did so relatively equally among those provinces. In the election they received thirteen seats or 4.3% of the seats in the House while they received 8.5% of the popular vote. The Canadian Alliance has a more of a regional support for their party, though it is making attempts to gain more national support. The Canadian Alliance was elected to 66 or 21.9% of the seats in the House while having 25.4% of the popular vote.(12) It is important at this time to look at the distribution of the seats across the country. It may appear that the Canadian Alliance does have national support, but upon further inspection, the Canadian Alliance was elected to fifty of their sixty-six seats in two provinces, Alberta and British Columbia. This problem of national and regional separation issue is a major flaw of the single member plurality system in Canada. This problem is especially apparent when the opposition, for example the Canadian Alliance, support is skewed by regional interests.
personal qualities	While the Plurality system may have its flaws in Canada it also has some advantages. Single member plurality is extremely effective in the election of representatives whose personal qualities best fit them for the function of government. One of the strengths of a single member plurality system is that a vote for a party or candidate is also choosing a government, which means that the electorate gets to choose the people that they believe are best fit for running the country. Single Member Plurality maintains the traditional link between Member of Parliament and constituents.(13) Due to the fact that the link between the elected and the elector is maintained voters have a direct say who they believe is best suited to represent them in Government. Along with electing representatives whose qualities best fit them for the function of government, single member plurality has a tendency to elect a strong and stable government. Plurality systems have an ability to produce single-party majoritarian government. "Research shows that single-party rule is more likely under plurality than under [Proportional Representation] systems."(14)
Proportional representation	Some have suggested due the weakness and skewed proportion of votes to seats; proportional representation would be a better electoral system for Canada. Proportional representation is an electoral system in which parties receive representation in Parliament relative to their respective shares of the popular vote.(15) There are two main types of proportional representation systems: the party list, and single transferable vote system. Under a party list system voters choose from among slates of candidates put forward by the various parties contesting an election. The party is entitled to seat the number of members from its list that corresponds to its share of the popular vote. Under the party list system, to prevent the emergence of splinter parties, jurisdictions set a vote threshold that parties must obtain in order to qualify for seats. One method of seat allocation is the Hare Quota. In the hare quota the number of votes cast is divided by the number of seats to be filled. The awarding of seats follows two steps. The first step is awarding a seat for each bloc of votes a party received. In the second step any remaining seats to be allocated are awarded on the basis of which party or parties have the highest number of votes remaining after the quotas have been used up.(16) Under the hare quota during the 2000 election the Liberal Party with 40.8 % of the vote would receive one hundred-twenty-five or 41.5% of the seats in the House. The Canadian Alliance with 25.4% of the vote would be elected to seventy-six or 25.2% of the seats. The New Democratic Party with 8.5% of the vote, elected to twenty-seven or 8.9% of the seats. The Progressive Conservative Party with 12.1% of the vote would be elected to thirty-nine or 12.9% of the seats.(17) Under the Hare Quota the average difference between the percent of seats awarded to the percent of votes was 0.075%, while in the same election under the single member plurality system the average difference was 0.35%.(18) In drawing a comparison between the party list system and the current system, the hare quota more accurately reflects the trends in voting and the majority of the electorate.
single transferable vote	The single transferable vote system is another method for awarding seats under the proportional representation system. The single transferable vote system emphasizes the individual rather than the party. Voters are given the opportunity to rank their choices among the candidates whose names appear on the ballot. The single transferable vote system has several steps for allocation of seats. The first step is to sort the votes among the first choices, and to be declared elected a candidate must obtain a certain threshold of the votes cast. After the threshold of votes in meet the excess is redistributed according to the second choice and then there is a recounting the votes. The process of counting and redistributing votes is continued until all seats are filled. Unfortunately for the elections in Canada it is difficult to tell what the outcome of this system would be as voters would rank their preferences. The single transferable vote system is currently used for the Australian Senate, Malta and the Republic of Ireland.(19)
wishes of the majority	Unlike the single member plurality system, the proportional representation system satisfies the first two goals of an electoral system. The proportional representation system is better able to elect a parliament reflecting the main trends of opinion within the electorate. Proportional representation has the ability to reflect more accurately the preferences of voters in terms of seats in parliament. It is able to reflect the preferences because the number of seats rewarded is based upon the number of votes cast for a party in the election. Under proportional representation it is possible to say that voter turn out would be higher for an election because "under proportional representation every vote counts equally towards electing a Member of Parliament."(20) The electorate has more of a say in electing the government therefore they would be more willing to vote as to compared to a single member plurality system. The proportional representation system is also able to have a government according to the wishes of the majority of the electorate.
regional issues	Proportional representation is able to satisfy the second goal by preventing the emergence of regional and national support issues. In the proportional representation system any vote for the party increases the probability that they will be elected to a seat in the House. In the 1997 election the Conservatives would have put more effort into the West. The Bloc might even have been tempted to run candidates outside of Quebec, since any votes garnered could only help it win seats.(21) In recognizing the possibility of a separatist party like the Bloc running candidates outside of their province would mean that this provincially supported party would have to change and run on a platform that would appeal to more people from across the country. With political parties having to change their platforms and reconsider strategies to be more appealing it is possible to say that the regional issues would be less prevalent and the national issues would easily come to the forefront.(22) With regional issues fading to the side, parties would be more likely to focus on national issues to ensure that they are elected to the House. Voter turn out would likely increase as under the current system in most ridings only one or two of the parties were real contenders but under proportional representation every vote adds more weight to the success of the party. With these two key ideals in mind the proportional representation system would satisfy and govern according to the wishes of the majority of the electorate.
not strong and stable	Under proportional representation unlike single member plurality, it does not satisfy the last two goals of the electing of representatives whose personal qualities best fit them for the function of government and secondly it usually does not result in a strong and stable government. Proportional representation encourages the emergence of the extreme view because voters are more wiling to cast votes for smaller parties when they know that their votes will produce tangible results.(23) This result can be seen under the Hare quota using the 2000 general election results. In the 2000 election, holding the results constant, four members from smaller parties (1 no affiliation, 2 Green Party and 1 Marijuana Party)(24) would be elected to the House. Under proportional representation it is unlikely to elect a majority government, therefore coalitions between parties are likely to form, which means that the electorate is not choosing the government that they think would be best suited for running the country.(25) Aside from not having the ability to elect a majority government, governments elected are not strong and stable.
unsatisfactory	Under proportional representation weak and instable governments often are the result of an election. The prime example of these coalition governments is in Israel. Due to the proportional representation system the proliferation of parties and unstable coalition governments have been encouraged, which has been the rule in Israel. In the 1988 election in Israel the representation in the Knesset was shared by sixteen parties, and of the one-hundred-twenty members elected the largest number of seats won by a party was forty-seven.(26) The bargaining among parties that occurs after an election to form a coalition continues long into the government building process. These coalitions are based on compromises between parties that often produce rifts that cannot be resolved. "Consequently, unless there are changes in governing coalitions, the coalition will collapse, leading to a new election."(27) Based on this it is argued that coalition governments are inherently unstable so that the electoral system that produces it is unsatisfactory.
no system is entirely perfect	In examining both the current system of single member plurality and of proportional representation it is fair to say that no system is entirely perfect. The two systems, arguably, fit together like a puzzle. Single member plurality meets the last two goals as stated above, but not the first two; however proportional representation meets the first two and not the last two. In order to meet all four goal it is possible to move to a mixed system of where the House is elected by both proportional representation and by single member plurality. The mix system would assign a certain proportion of the seats based on single member plurality with some seats remaining to be awarded based on popular vote. The mix system has an approximate congruence between the share of the vote and the share of seats in the House. The style is currently in use in Germany and is called a "mixed-member proportional" system.(28) Under this system the "ordinary voter, who wants to elect the best person as her MP, but also to support the party whose priorities for governing are closest to her own,"(29) is able to do this. Under this system the voter casts two votes, one for a local constituency member and one for a political party. Eventually the number of seats each party receives is determined by a formula, which ensures that the Bundestag is constituted in proportion to the vote’s caste in the proportional representation election. Under this system like the other proportional representation systems a certain percent of the votes are required to gain representation in order to prevent the appearance of splinter parties. Due to the complexity of the system major political groups are represented fairly but small ones are restricted, so that the number of parties is kept manageable.(30)
mix system	Unfortunately the system depends on the voting behavior of the electorate. Three theories suggest different voting behaviors. First the "supermarket" voter theory suggests that rational voters examine the options and make their selection on voting day just as they choose among products in a supermarket. The social group voting theory suggests that people vote according to their affiliation with social and economic groups. The third theory of attitudinal voting suggests that the attitudes are the most important influence in determining how individual vote in elections.(31) It is unfortunate to say that these theories are wrong, as voters tend to choose their candidate while in the polling station. More short-term influences such as the electoral campaign and the political parties (such as the leadership and the images projected) play a greater role in voting behaviors than long term influences such as social cleavages and socioeconomic factors (such as class, religion, ethnicity, and gender).(32) Taking these voting behaviors into mind there is no perfect single voting system for a representative democracy, yet another reason why it is better to go with a mix system.
satisfy the four goals	This mixed-member proportional system would satisfy the four goals of an electoral system for Canada. The parliament is able to reflect the main trends of opinion within the electorate because the number of seats a party receives is proportional to the popular vote. The mixed-member proportional system elects government according to the wishes of the majority of the electorate because voters are able to cast a vote for the party they think would be the best for running country. The voters are also able to vote for the Member of Parliament that they think would best represent their constituency therefore the representatives are those whose personal qualities best fit them for the function of government. This system provides for a strong and stable government as is does no lead to coalition governments but it does allow for the representation of smaller parties.
-------------References
1. -	O’Neal, Brian. Electoral Systems, Political and Social Affairs Division, Parliamentary Research Branch, 1993 p. 3
2. -	Lakeman, Enid. How Democracies Vote: A Study of Electoral Systems, Faber and Faber, London, 1974 p. 28
3.	O’Neal p. 13
4.	Appendix A
5. -	Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the 37th General Election of Canada held on November 27, 2001 p. 106
6. -	Pammett, J. Elections Canadian Politics in the 21st Century, Nelson Thomson Learning, 2000 p. 170
7.	O’Neal p. 12
8. -	Blais, A. "The Debate over Electoral Systems," International Political Science Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1991 p. 54
9.	Lakeman p. 57
10. -	Cairns, Alan. "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.1 No. 1 March 1968, p. 57
11.	O’Neal p. 13
12.	Appendix A
13.	Jackson and Jackson. An Introduction to Political Science, Prentice Hall, Ontario, 2000 p. 400
14.	Blais p 240
15.	Jackson and Jackson. Politics in Canada 4th Edition, Prentice Hall, Ontario, 1998 p. 622
16.	O’Neal p. 6
17.	Appendix C
18.	Appendix A
19.	O’Neal p. 10
20. -	Milner, H. The Case for Proportional Representation in Canada. Party Politics in Canada 8th Edition, Prentice Hall, Ontario, 2001 p. 209
21. -	Milner, H. The Case for Proportional Representation in Canada. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1997 p. 7
22.	Milner (B) p. 7
23.	O’Neal p. 14
24.	Appendix C
25.	O’Neal p. 15
26.	Jackson and Jackson (B) p. 417
27.	O’Neal p. 15
28.	Milner (A) p. 210
29.	Milner (A) p. 210
30.	Jackson and Jackson (B) p. 419
31.	Jackson and Jackson (B) p. 405
32.	Jackson and Jackson (B) p. 406
-----Appendix Sources
APPENDIX A:	Summary of the 2000 results 2000 Election Results
APPENDIX B:	Detailed summary of the 2000 results 2000 Election results
APPENDIX C:	Summary of the Hare Quota (2000) Hare Quota results (based on 2000 election results)
APPENDIX D: -	Detailed Summary of the Hare Quota (2000) Hare Quota results (based on 2000 election results) (detailed results)
APPENDIX E: -	10% Compensation (1997) Weaver, K. A Hybrid Electoral System for Canada, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1997
APPENDIX F: -	Proportional Representation (1997) Milner, H. The Case for Proportional Representation in Canada, Party Politics in Canada 8th edition p. 209
----Biblography
	Blais, A. "The Debate over Electoral Systems," International Political Science Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1991
	Cairns, Alan. "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.1 No. 1 March 1968, p. 55-88.
	Jackson and Jackson. Politics in Canada 4th Edition, Prentice Hall, Ontario, 1998
	Jackson and Jackson. An Introduction to Political Science, Prentice Hall, Ontario, 2000.
	Lakeman, Enid. How Democracies Vote: A Study of Electoral Systems, Faber and Faber, London, 1974.
	Milner, H. The Case for Proportional Representation in Canada. Party Politics in Canada 8th Edition, Prentice Hall, Ontario, 2001, (p.206-220)
	Milner, H. The Case for Proportional Representation in Canada. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1997 (p. 6-9)
	O’Neal, Brian. Electoral Systems, Political and Social Affairs Division, Parliamentary Research Branch, 1993.
	Pammett, J. Elections Canadian Politics in the 21st Century, Nelson Thomson Learning, 2000.
	Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the 37th General Election of Canada held on November 27, 2001, http://www.elections.ca/gen/rep/re2/stat2000ge_e.pdf.